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The Internet as a Speech Machine and Other Myths Confounding Section 230 Reform 
 
Danielle Keats Citron* and Mary Anne Franks** 
 
Abstract 
 
A robust public debate is currently underway about the responsibility of online platforms. 
We have long called for this discussion, but only recently has it been seriously taken up by 
legislators and the public. The debate begins with a basic question: should platforms should 
be responsible for user-generated content? If so, under what circumstances? What exactly 
would such responsibility look like? Under consideration is Section 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act—a provision originally designed to encourage tech 
companies to clean up “offensive” online content. The public discourse around Section 230, 
however, is riddled with misconceptions. As an initial matter, many people who opine 
about the law are unfamiliar with its history, text, and application. This lack of knowledge 
impairs thoughtful evaluation of the law’s goals and how well they have been achieved.  
Accordingly, Part I of this Article sets the stage with a description of Section 230—its 
legislative history and purpose, its interpretation in the courts, and the problems that 
current judicial interpretation raises. A second, and related, major source of 
misunderstanding is the conflation of Section 230 and the First Amendment. Part II details 
how this conflation distorts discussion in three ways: it assumes all Internet activity is 
protected speech; it treats private actors as though they were government actors; and it 
presumes that regulation will inevitably result in less speech. These distortions must be 
addressed in order to pave the way for clear-eyed policy reform. Part III offers potential 
solutions to help Section 230 achieve its legitimate goals. 
 
Introduction 
 
A robust public debate is currently underway about the responsibility of online 
platforms. We have long called for this discussion,1 but only recently has it been seriously 
taken up by legislators and the public. The debate begins with a basic question: should 
platforms should be responsible for user-generated content?2 If so, under what 
circumstances? What exactly would such responsibility look like?     
 
 
* Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law, Vice President, Cyber Civil Rights Initiative. 
** Professor of Law & Dean’s Distinguished Scholar, University of Miami School of Law, President, Cyber 
Civil Rights Initiative. Deep thanks to the editors of the University of Chicago Legal Forum for including 
us in the symposium. Genevieve Lakier, Brian Leiter, and symposium participants provided helpful 
comments. It was a particular pleasure to engage with co-panelists Amy Adler, Leslie Kendrick, and Fred 
Schauer. 
1 DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE (2014); Danielle Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, 
The Internet Will Not Break: Denying Bad Samaritans Section 230 Immunity, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 401 (2017); 
Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61 (2009); Mary Anne Franks, Sexual Harassment 
2.0, Md. L. Rev. (2012). 
2 That is, beyond the select avenues that currently are not shielded from liability, such as intellectual 
property, federal criminal law, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, and the knowing facilitation 
of sex trafficking. 
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 2 
Under consideration is Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act—a provision 
originally designed to encourage tech companies to clean up “offensive” online content. 
At the dawn of the commercial internet, federal lawmakers wanted the internet to be 
open and free, but they realized that such openness risked noxious activity.3 In their 
estimation, tech companies were essential partners in any effort to “clean up the 
Internet.”  
A troubling 1995 judicial decision, however, imperiled the promise of self-regulation in 
ruling that any attempt to moderate content increased an online service’s risk of liability.4 
Lawmakers devised Section 230 as a direct repudiation of that ruling. The idea was to 
incentivize—not penalize—private efforts to filter, block, or otherwise address noxious 
activity.5 Section 230 provided that incentive, securing a shield from liability for “Good 
Samaritans” that under- or over-filtered “offensive” content.6 
Over the past two (plus) decades, Section 230 has helped secure a variety of opportunities 
for online engagement, but individuals and society have not been the clear winners. 
Regrettably, state and lower federal courts have extended Section 230’s legal shield far 
beyond what the law’s words, context, and purpose support.7 Platforms have been 
shielded from liability even when they encourage illegal action, deliberately keep up 
manifestly harmful content, or take a cut of users’ illegal activities.8 
 
No matter, because for many, Section 230 is an article of faith. Section 230 has been hailed 
as “the most important law protecting internet speech” and online innovation.9 For years, 
to question Section 230’s value proposition was viewed as sheer folly.  
 
No longer. Politicians across the ideological spectrum are raising concerns about the 
leeway provided content platforms under Section 230.10 Conservatives claim that Section 
230 gives tech companies a license to silence speech based on viewpoint.11 Liberals 
criticize Section 230 for giving platforms the freedom to profit from harmful speech and 
conduct.  
 
3 Written Testimony of Danielle Keats Citron before House Energy and Commerce Committee in “Fostering 
a Healthier Internet to Protect Consumers” hearing (October 16, 2019), available at, 
https://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF16/20191016/110075/HHRG-116-IF16-Wstate-CitronD-
20191016.pdf. 
4 See Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 
1995). For a superb history of Section 230 and the cases leading to its passage, see JEFF KOSSEFF, THE TWENTY-
SIX WORDS THAT CREATED THE INTERNET (2019). 
5 CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note, at 170-73. 
6 Citron & Wittes, supra note, at 404-06.  
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 CDA 230: The Most Important Law Protecting Internet Speech, Electronic Frontier Found., 
https://www.eff.org/issues/cda230. 
10 Danielle Citron & Quinta Jurecic, Platform Justice, Hoover Institute. 
11 https://www.cruz.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=4630 
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Although their assessment of the problem differs, lawmakers agree that Section 230 needs 
fixing. In a testament to the shift in attitudes, the House Energy and Commerce 
Committee held a hearing on October 16, 2019 on how to make the internet “healthier” 
for consumers, bringing together academics (including one of us, Citron), advocates, and 
social media companies to discuss whether and how to amend Section 230.12 The 
Department of Justice is holding an event devoted to Section 230 reform in February 2020. 
Needless to say, these developments are unique. 
 
In a few short years, Section 230 reform efforts have turned from academic fantasy to 
legislative reality.13 One might think that we would cheer this opportunity. But we 
approach it with caution. Congress cannot fix what it does not understand. Sensible 
policymaking depends on a clear-eyed view of the interests at stake. As advisers to 
federal lawmakers on both sides of the aisle, we can attest to the need to dispel 
misunderstandings to clear the ground for meaningful policy discussions.  
 
The public discourse around Section 230 is riddled with misconceptions.14 As an initial 
matter, many people who opine about the law are unfamiliar with its history, text, and 
application. This lack of knowledge impairs thoughtful evaluation of the law’s goals and 
how well they have been achieved.  Accordingly, Part I of this Article sets the stage with 
a description of Section 230—its legislative history and purpose, its interpretation in the 
courts, and the problems that current judicial interpretation raises. A second, and related, 
major source of misunderstanding is the conflation of Section 230 and the First 
Amendment. Part II of this Article details how this conflation distorts discussion in three 
ways: it assumes all Internet activity is protected speech; it treats private actors as though 
they were government actors; and it presumes that regulation will inevitably result in 
less speech. These distortions must be addressed in order to pave the way for clear-eyed 
policy reform. This is the subject of Part III, which offers potential solutions to help 
Section 230 achieve its legitimate goals. 
 
I. Section 230: A Complex History 
 
12 Witnesses also included computer scientist Hany Farid of University of California at Berkeley, Gretchen 
Petersen of the Alliance to Counter Crime Online, Corynne McSherry of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, 
Steve Huffman of Reddit, and Katie Oyama of Google. At that hearing, one of us (Citron) took the 
opportunity to combat myths around Section 230 and offer sensible reform possibilities, which we explore 
in Part III. https://energycommerce.house.gov/committee-activity/hearings/hearing-on-fostering-a-
healthier-internet-to-protect-consumers 
13 There are several House and Senate proposals to amend or remove Section 230’s legal shield. 
14 This is not to say that every lawmaker misunderstands Section 230. Nancy Pelosi, the House Speaker, 
has agreed that Section 230 should be rethought because companies are not “treating it with respect” and 
“being responsible enough.” https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20190411/18521741986/nancy-pelosi-
joins-ted-cruz-louis-gohmert-attacking-cda-230.shtml. Pelosi’s comments suggest that she has a clear sense 
of the problem—that tech companies are not acting as responsible Good Samaritans as Section 230’s 
drafters hoped—unlike far too many of her colleagues. 
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Tech policy reform is often a difficult endeavor. Sound tech policy reform depends upon 
a clear understanding of the technologies and varied interests at stake. As recent hearings 
on Capitol Hill have shown, lawmakers often struggle to effectively address fast-moving 
technological developments.15 Part of the problem stems from age and habits.16 The 
slowness of the lawmaking process further complicates matters.17 Lawmakers may be 
tempted to throw up their hands in the face of technological change that seems destined 
to outpace their efforts. 
 
This Part highlights the developments that bring us to this moment of reform. Section 230 
was devised to incentivize responsible content moderation practices.18 And yet its 
drafting fell short of that goal by failing to explicitly condition the legal shield on 
responsible practices. This has led to an overbroad reading of Section 230, with significant 
costs to individuals and society. 
 
A. Reviewing the History Behind Section 230 
 
In 1996, Congress faced a challenge. Lawmakers wanted the internet to be open and free, 
but they also knew that openness risked the posting of illegal and “offensive” material. 
They knew that federal agencies could not deal with it all “noxious material” on their 
own and that they needed tech companies to help moderate content. Congress devised 
an incentive: a shield from liability for “Good Samaritans” that did an incomplete or 
overly aggressive job in their efforts to “clean up the Internet.”19  
 
The Communications Decency Act (CDA), part of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 
was introduced to make the internet safer for children and to address concerns about 
 
15 The 2018 congressional hearings on the Cambridge Analytica data leak poignantly illustrate the point. 
For instance, Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg testified for several days before the House and the Senate. 
During the questioning, lawmakers made clear that they had never used social network and had little 
understanding of online advertising, which is how the dominant tech companies make money. Senator 
Orrin Hatch asked Zuckerberg how his company made money since it does not charge users for its services. 
https://money.cnn.com/2018/04/10/technology/senate-mark-zuckerberg-testimony/index.html. As is 
clear from committee hearings and our work, there are indeed lawmakers and staff devoted to tackling 
tech policy including Senator Kamala Harris, Senator Richard Blumenthal, Congresswoman Jackie Speier, 
and Congresswoman Kathleen Clark. 
16 We know from experience that staff endeavor to remedy those deficits. 
17 A widely known quip is that federal laws take on average seven years to get passed. Not so of course 
with urgent matters, especially when lawmakers’ selfish interests hang in the balance. The Video Privacy 
Protection Act’s rapid-fire passage is an obvious case in point. That law passed in mere months after the 
failed nomination of Judge Robert Bork to the Supreme Court revealed that journalists could easily obtain 
people’s video rental records. Lawmakers fearing that their video rental records would be released to the 
public passed VPPA in short order. See William McGeveran, Data Privacy and Policy (2017). 
18 Or at least this is the most generous reading of its history. One of us (Franks) is somewhat more 
skeptical about the narrative that Section 230’s flaws were not evident at its inception. See Mary Anne 
Franks, The Cult of the Constitution, supra note, at. 
19 Citron & Wittes, supra note, at. 
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pornography.20  Besides proposing criminal penalties for the distribution of sexually 
explicit material online, members of Congress underscored the need for private sector 
help in reducing the volume of “offensive” material online. Then-Representatives 
Christopher Cox and Ron Wyden offered an amendment to the CDA entitled “Protection 
for Private Blocking and Screening of Offensive Material.”21 The Cox-Wyden 
Amendment, codified as Section 230, provided immunity from liability for “Good 
Samaritan” online service providers that over- or under-filtered objectionable content.22 
Section 230(c), entitled “Good Samaritan blocking and filtering of offensive content,” has 
two key provisions. Section 230(c)(1) specifies that providers or users of interactive 
computer services will not be treated as publishers or speakers of user-generated 
content.23 Section 230(c)(2) says that online service providers will not be held liable for 
good-faith filtering or blocking of user-generated content.24 Section 230 also carves out 
limitations for its immunity provisions: its protections do not apply to violations of 
federal criminal law, intellectual property law, the Electronic Privacy Communications 
Act, and, as of 2018, the facilitation of sex trafficking.25  
 
In 1996, lawmakers could hardly have imagined the role that the internet would play in 
modern life. Yet Section 230’s authors were prescient. In their view, “if this amazing new 
thing – the Internet – [was] going to blossom,” companies should not be “punished for 
trying to keep things clean.”26 Cox recently explained that, “the original purpose of 
[Section 230] was to help clean up the Internet, not to facilitate people doing bad things 
on the Internet.”27 The key to Section 230, Wyden agreed, was “making sure that 
companies in return for that protection – that they wouldn’t be sued indiscriminately – 
were being responsible in terms of policing their platforms.”28 
B. Explaining the Judiciary’s Interpretation of Section 230 
 
The judiciary’s interpretation of Section 230 has not squared with this vision. Rather than 
a legal shield for responsible moderation efforts, courts have stretched Section 230 far 
beyond what its words, context, and purpose support.29 Section 230 has been read to 
immunize platforms from liability that:  
 
 
20 Citron & Wittes, supra note, at. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). 
24 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2). 
25 47 U.S.C. § 230(e). 
26 See Citron & Jurecic, supra note. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Citron & Wittes, supra note, at 406-10; Mary Anne Franks, How the Internet Unmakes the Law, 
Ohio S. Tech. L. J. (forthcoming 2020). 
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• knew about users’ illegal activity, deliberately refused to 
remove it, and ensured that those responsible could not be 
identified;30  
• solicited users to engage in tortious and illegal activity;31 and  
• designed their sites to enhance the visibility of illegal activity 
and to ensure that the perpetrators could not be identified and 
caught.32  
 
Courts have attributed this broad-sweeping approach to the fact that “First Amendment 
values [drove] the CDA.”33 For support, court have pointed to Section 230’s “findings” 
and “policy” sections, which highlight the importance of the “vibrant and competitive 
free market that presently exists” for the internet and the internet’s role in facilitating 
“myriad avenues for intellectual activity” and the “diversity of political discourse.”34 As 
one of us (Franks) has underscored, Congress’ stated goals also included the: 
 
development of technologies that “maximize user control over what information is 
received” by Internet users, as well as the “vigorous enforcement of Federal criminal 
laws to deter and publish trafficking in obscenity, stalking and harassment by means 
of the computer.” In other words, the law [wa]s intended to promote the values of 
privacy, security and liberty alongside the values of open discourse.35 
 
Section 230’s liability shield has been extended to activity that has little or nothing to do 
with free speech, such as the sale of dangerous products.36 Consider Armslist.com, the 
self-described “firearms marketplace.”37 Unlicensed gun sellers use the site to find buyers 
who cannot pass background checks.38 Armslist.com is where Radcliffe Haughton 
illegally purchased a gun.39 Haughton’s estranged wife obtained a restraining order 
against him that banned him from legally purchasing a firearm.40 Haughton used 
Armslist.com, to easily find a gun seller that did not require a background check.41 He 
 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Citron, Section 230’s Challenge to Civil Rights and Civil Liberties. See generally Olivier Sylvain, 
Intermediary Design Duties, 50 CONN. L. REV. 1 (2017). 
33 Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 18 (1st Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 622 (2017). 
34 See, e.g., Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2009). 
35 Mary Anne Franks, The Lawless Internet? Myths and Misconceptions About CDA Section 230, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Feb. 17, 2014). 
36 See, e.g., Hinton v. Amazon.com, LLC, 72 F. Supp. 3d 685, 687, 690 (S.D. Miss. 2014); Franks, How the 
Internet, supra __ at __.  
37 https://www.armslist.com/ 
38 See Mary Anne Franks, Our Collective Responsibility for Mass Shootings, N.Y. TIMES, October 11, 2019, 
available at https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/09/opinion/mass-shooting-responsibility.html. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
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used the gun he purchased to murder his estranged wife and her two co-workers.42 The 
Wisconsin Supreme Court found Armslist immune from liability based on Section 230, 
despite the fact that its activities – i.e., knowingly profiting from illegal firearms 
purchases - were conduct, not speech.43 
 
Extending Section 230’s shield from liability to platforms that refuse to prohibit, and in 
some cases deliberately encourage, unlawful activity directly contradicts the stated goals 
of the CDA. Armslist.com can hardly be said to “provide ‘educational and informational 
resources’ or contribute to ‘the diversity of political discourse.’”44 Immunizing from 
liability enterprises that have nothing to do with moderating online speech, such as 
marketplaces that connect sellers of deadly weapons with prohibited buyers for a cut of 
the profits, is unjustifiable.  
 
C. Evaluating the Status Quo 
 
Section 230’s overbroad interpretation means that platforms have scant legal incentive to 
combat online abuse. Rebecca Tushnet put it well a decade ago:  Section 230 ensures that 
platforms enjoy “power without responsibility.”45  
 
Market forces alone are unlikely to encourage responsible content moderation. Platforms 
make their money through online advertising generated when users like, click, and 
share.46 Allowing attention-grabbing abuse to remain online often accords with 
platforms’ rational self-interest.47 Platforms “produce nothing and sell nothing except 
advertisements and information about users, and conflict among those users may be 
good for business.”48 If a company’s analytics suggest that people pay more attention to 
content that makes them sad or angry, then the company will highlight such content.49 
Research shows that people are more attracted to negative and novel information.50 Thus, 
keeping up destructive content may make the most sense for a company’s bottom line. 
 
42 Id. 
43 Id. The non-profit organization the Cyber Civil Rights Initiative, of which one of us (Franks) is the 
President and one of us (Citron) is the Vice President, filed an amicus brief in support of the petitioner’s 
request for writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court. Brief of Amicus Curiae of Cyber Civil Rights Initiative 
and Legal Academics in Support of Petitioners in Yasmine Daniel v. Armslist.com, available at 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/19/19-153/114340/20190830155050530_Brief.PDF. 
44 Amicus Curiae of Cyber Civil Right Initiative, supra note, at 16. 
45 Rebecca Tushnet, Power without Responsibility: Intermediaries and the First Amendment, 76 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 986 (2008). 
46 Mary Anne Franks, Justice Beyond Dispute, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1374, 1386 (2018) (reviewing ETHAN KATSH 
& ORNA RABINOVICH-EINY, DIGITAL JUSTICE: TECHNOLOGY AND THE INTERNET OF DISPUTES (2017)). 
47 Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Mobs, Disinformation, and Death Videos: The Internet As It Is (and as It Should 
Be), 118 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020). 
48 Id. 
49 Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Rohit Chopra, In re Facebook, Inc., Commission File No. 1823109, 
at 2 (July 24, 2019). 
50 Id. 
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As Federal Trade Commissioner Rohit Chopra warned in his powerful dissent from 
the agency’s 2019 settlement with Facebook, the behavioral advertising business 
model is the “root cause of [social media companies’] widespread and systemic 
problems.”51 Online behavioral advertising generates profits by “turning users into 
products, their activity into assets,” and their platforms into “weapons of mass 
manipulation.”52 Tech companies “have few incentives to stop [online abuse], and in 
some cases are incentivized to ignore or aggravate [it].”53 
 
To be sure, the dominant tech companies have moderated certain content by shadow 
banning, filtering, or blocking it.54 What often motivates these efforts is pressure from 
the European Commission to remove hate speech and terrorist activity.55 The same 
companies have banned certain forms of online abuse, such as nonconsensual 
pornography56 and threats, in response to pressure from users, advocacy groups, and 
advertisers.57 They have expended resources to stem abuse when it has threatened 
their bottom line.58  
 
Yet the online advertising business model continues to incentivize revenue-generating 
content that causes significant harm to the most vulnerable among us. Online abuse 
generates traffic, clicks, and shares because it is salacious and negative.59 Deep fake 
pornography sites60 as well as revenge porn and gossip sites61 thrive thanks to 
advertising revenue.  
 
 
51 Id.  
52 Id. 
53 Franks, Justice Beyond Dispute, supra note, at 1386.  
54 Danielle Keats Citron, Extremist Speech, Compelled Conformity, and Censorship Creep, 93 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1035 (2018); Danielle Keats Citron & Helen Norton, Intermediaries and Hate Speech: Fostering Digital 
Citizenship for the Information Age, 91 B.U. L REV. 1435, 1468-71 (2011). 
55 Citron, Extremist Speech, Compelled Conformity, and Censorship Creep, supra note, at 1038-39. 
56 See Mary Anne Franks, Revenge Porn Reform: A View from the Front Lines, Fla. L. Rev. (2017). 
57 Id. at 1037.  
58 CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note, at 229 (discussing how Facebook changed its position 
on pro rape pages after fifteen companies threatened to pull their ads); Mary Anne Franks, “Revenge 
Porn” Reform: A View from the Front Lines, 69 FLA. L. REV. 1251 (2017). 
59 For instance, eight of the top ten pornography websites host deepfake pornography, and there are nine 
deepfake pornography websites hosting 13,254 fake porn videos (mostly featuring female celebrities 
without their consent). These sites generate income from advertising. Indeed, as the first comprehensive 
study of deepfake video and audio explains, “deepfake pornography represents a growing business 
opportunity, with all of these websites featuring some form of advertising.” Deeptrace Labs, The State of 
Deepfakes: Landscape, Threats, and Impact 6 (September 2019), available at 
https://storage.googleapis.com/deeptrace-public/Deeptrace-the-State-of-Deepfakes-2019.pdf. 
60 Id. 
61 See, e.g., Erna Besic Psycho Mom of Two!, THEDIRTY (Oct. 9, 2019, 10:02 AM), https://thedirty.com/#post-
2374229. 
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Without question, Section 230 has been valuable to innovation and expression.62 It has 
enabled vast and sundry businesses. It has led to the rise of social media companies that 
many people find valuable, such as Facebook, Twitter, and Reddit.  
 
At the same time, Section 230 has subsidized platforms whose business is online abuse. 
It enables platforms to make money off of abuse without having to bear the costs that its 
business externalizes.63 It takes away the leverage that victims might have had to get 
harmful content take down.  
 
This laissez-faire approach has been costly to individuals, groups, and society. As more 
than ten years of research have shown, cyber mobs and individual harassers target 
individuals with sexually threatening and sexually humiliating online abuse.64 According 
to a 2017 Pew Research Center study, one in five U.S. adults have experienced online 
harassment that includes stalking, threats of violence, or cyber sexual harassment.65 More 
often, targeted individuals are women–particularly women of color and bisexual women-
– and other sexual minorities.66  
 
Victims of online abuse do not feel safe on- or offline.67 They experience anxiety and 
severe emotional distress. They suffer damage to their reputations, their intimate 
relationships, their employment and educational opportunities. Some victims are forced 
to relocate, change jobs, or even change their names.68 In the face of online assaults, 
victims have difficulty finding employment or keeping their jobs because the abuse 
appears in searches of their names.69  
 
Failing to address online abuse does not just inflict economic, physical, and psychological 
harms on victims – it also jeopardizes their right to free speech. Online abuse silences 
victims.70 Targeted individuals often shut down social media profiles and email accounts 
 
62 CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note, at. 
63 See Mary Anne Franks, Moral Hazard on Stilts, Knight Institute of the First Amendment (2019). 
64 See generally CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note. The 2017 Pew study found that one in four 
Black individuals say they have been subject to online harassment due to their race; one in ten Hispanic 
individuals have said the same. For white individuals, the share is far lower: just three percent. Women are 
twice as likely as men to say they have been targeted online due to their gender (11 percent versus 5 
percent). Duggan, supra note. Other studies have made clear that LGBTQ individuals are particularly 
vulnerable to online harassment, CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note, and nonconsensual 
pornography. Data & Society, Online Harassment, Digital Abuse, and Cyberstalking in America 
(November 21, 2016), available at https://innovativepublichealth.org/wp-content/uploads/2_Online-
Harassment-Report_Final.pdf. 
65 Maeve Duggan, Online Harassment 2017 Study, Pew Research Center (July 11, 2017). 
66 CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Jonathon W. Penney, Chilling Effects: Online Surveillance and Wikipedia Use, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 117, 
125–26 (2016); see also Jonathon W. Penney, Internet Surveillance, Regulation, and Chilling Effects Online: A 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3532691
University of Chicago Legal Forum (forthcoming 2020) 
 
 10 
and withdraw from public discourse.71 Those with political ambitions are deterred from 
running for office.72 Journalists refrain from reporting on controversial topics. Sexual 
assault victims are discouraged from holding perpetrators accountable.  
 
An overly capacious view of Section 230 has undermined equal opportunity in 
employment, politics, journalism, education, cultural influence, and free speech.73 The 
benefits Section 230's immunity has enabled likely could have been secured at a lesser 
price.74 
 
II. Debunking the Myths about Section 230 
 
After writing about overbroad interpretations of Section 230 for more than a decade, we 
have eagerly anticipated the moment when federal lawmakers would begin listening to 
concerns about Section 230. Today, finally, lawmakers are questioning the received 
wisdom that any tinkering with Section 230 would lead to a profoundly worse society.  
 
Yet we approach this moment with a healthy dose of skepticism. Nothing is gained if 
Section 230 is changed to indulge bad faith claims, address fictitious concerns, or 
disincentivize content moderation. We have been down this road before and it is not 
pretty.75 Yes, Section 230 is in need of reform, but not if it would make matters worse.  
 
Our reservations stem from misconceptions riddling the debate. Those now advocating 
repealing or amending Section 230 often dramatically claim that broad platform 
immunity betrays free speech guarantees by sanctioning the censorship of political views. 
By contrast, Section 230 absolutists oppose any effort to amend Section 230 on the 
grounds that broad platform immunity is indispensable to free speech guarantees. Both 
sides tend to conflate the First Amendment and Section 230, though to very different 
ends. This conflation reflects and reinforces three major misconceptions. One is the 
presumption that all Internet activity is speech. The second is the treatment of private 
actors as if they were government actors. The third is the assumption that any regulation 
of online conduct will inevitably result in less speech. This Part identifies and debunks 
these prevailing myths. 
 
Comparative Case Study, 6 INTERNET POL’Y REV., May 26, 2017, at 1, 3. See generally CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN 
CYBERSPACE, supra note, at; Danielle Keats Citron, Civil Rights In Our Information Age, in THE OFFENSIVE 
INTERNET (Saul Levmore & Martha C. Nussbaum, eds. 2010); Citron & Richards, supra note, at 1365 (“[N]ot 
everyone can freely engage online. This is especially true for women, minorities, and political dissenters 
who are more often the targets of cyber mobs and individual harassers.”); Citron & Franks, supra note, at 
385; Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, supra note. 
71 Id. 
72 Katie Hill, for instance, resigned from Congress after her vengeful ex shared intimate photos of her and 
a woman who she and her husband were engaged in a consensual relationship. 
73 MARY ANNE FRANKS, THE CULT OF THE CONSTITUTION (2019). 
74 Citron & Wittes, supra note. 
75 FOSTA-SESTA as case in point. 
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A. The Internet as a Speech Machine 
 
Both detractors and supporters agree that Section 230 provides online intermediaries 
broad immunity from liability for third-party content. The real point of contention 
between the two groups is whether this broad immunity is a good or a bad thing. While 
critics of Section 230 point to the extensive range of harmful activity that the law’s 
deregulatory stance effectively allows to flourish, Section 230 enthusiasts argue that the 
law’s laissez-faire nature is vital to ensuring a robust online marketplace of ideas.   
 
Section 230 enthusiast Elizabeth Nolan Brown argues that “Section 230 is the Internet’s 
First Amendment.”76 David Williams, president of the Taxpayers Protection Alliance, 
similarly contends that, “The internet flourishes when social media platforms allow for 
discourse and debate without fear of a tidal wave of liability. Ending Section 230 would 
shutter this marketplace of ideas at tremendous cost.”77 Eric Goldman contends that 
Section 230 is “even better than the First Amendment.”78 
 
The view of Section 230 presumes that the Internet is primarily, if not exclusively, a 
medium of speech. The text of Section 230 reinforces this characterization through the use 
of the terms “publishers” and “speakers” in 230(c)(2) as well as the finding that the 
“Internet and other interactive computer services offer a forum for a true diversity of 
political discourse, unique opportunities for cultural development, and myriad avenues 
for intellectual activity.”79  
 
But the assertion that the Internet is primarily a medium of speech should be 
interrogated.80 When Section 230 was passed, it may have made sense to think of the 
Internet that way. In 1996, the Internet had for most of its history been text-based and 
limited to non-commercial activity. Only 20 million American adults had Internet access, 
and these users spent less than half an hour a month online. By comparison, in 2019, 293 
million Americans were using the Internet,81 and they were using it not only to 
communicate, but also to buy and sell merchandise, find dates, make restaurant 
reservations, watch television, read books, stream music, and look for jobs.82 As one 
Section 230 proponent has described it, 
 
76 https://reason.com/2019/07/29/section-230-is-the-internets-first-amendment-now-both-republicans-
and-democrats-want-to-take-it-away/ 
77https://www.theverge.com/2019/7/10/20688778/congress-section-230-conservative-internet-law-
content-moderation 
78 Eric Goldman, Why Section 230 Is Better than the First Amendment, 95 Notre Dame L. Rev. Reflections 
(2019). 
79 § 230(a)(3). 
80 See Franks, How the Internet Unmakes the Law. 
81 J. Clement, Internet usage in the United States - Statistics & Facts, Statista (Aug. 20, 2019) 
https://www.statista.com/topics/2237/internet-usage-in-the-united-states/. 
82 J. Clement, Most popular online activities of adult internet users in the United States as of November 2017, 
Statista (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.statista.com/statistics/183910/internet-activities-of-us-users/. 
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the entire suite of products we think of as the internet—search engines, 
social media, online publications with comments sections, Wikis, private 
message boards, matchmaking apps, job search sites, consumer review 
tools, digital marketplaces, Airbnb, cloud storage companies, podcast 
distributors, app stores, GIF clearinghouses, crowdsourced funding 
platforms, chat tools, email newsletters, online classifieds, video sharing 
venues, and the vast majority of what makes up our day-to-day digital 
experience—have benefited from the protections offered by Section 230.    
 
Many of these activities have very little to do with speech, and indeed many of the offline 
cognates would not be considered protected speech for First Amendment purposes. “Like 
any other rule, the First Amendment does not regulate the full range of human 
behavior.”83 The First Amendment draws a line, contested though it might be, between 
speech and conduct. While some actions are sufficiently expressive to be considered 
speech for First Amendment purposes,84 “[t]he government generally has a freer hand in 
restricting expressive conduct than it has in restricting the written or spoken word.”85 
The Court has made clear that conduct is not automatically protected simply because it 
involves language in some way: “it has never been deemed an abridgement of freedom 
of speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in 
part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either spoken, written, or 
printed."86  
 
That is, while many Supreme Court free speech cases are focused on whether a particular 
kind of speech is protected, and to what degree, by the First Amendment, whether an act 
is speech at all for the purposes of the First Amendment is an even more fundamental 
question. When presented with cases involving the wearing of black armbands, setting 
flags on fire, making financial contributions to political campaigns, or burning draft 
cards, the Court has first engaged with the question of whether the acts in question are 
being regulated as speech before turning to the degree of protection that speech is 
afforded. The answer to the question “is it speech” can often be, once one is no longer 
dealing with the spoken or printed word, very complicated. As one of us (Citron) has 
written, “[a]dvances in law and technology . . . complicate this distinction as they make 
more actions achievable through ‘mere’ words.”87 Because so much online activity 
involves elements that are not unambiguously speech-related, whether such activities are 
in fact speech should be a subject of express inquiry.  
 
83 Frederick Schauer, The Politics and Incentives of First Amendment Coverage, 56 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1613, 
1617–18 (2015). 
84 See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (wearing of black 
armbands conveyed message regarding a matter of public concern). 
85 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406, 109 S.Ct. 2533, 2540, 105 L.Ed.2d 342 (1989); see also United States v. 
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968). 
86 Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949). 
87 Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. Rev. 61, 99 (2009). 
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But the conflation of Section 230 and the First Amendment short-circuits this inquiry. 
Intermediaries invoking Section 230 implicitly characterize the acts or omissions at issue 
as speech, and courts allow them to do so without challenge. When “courts routinely 
interpret Section 230 to immunize all claims based on third-party content,” including 
“negligence; deceptive trade practices, unfair competition, and false advertising; the 
common law privacy torts; tortious interference with contract or business relations; 
intentional infliction of emotional distress; and dozens of other legal doctrines,”88 they 
grant online intermediaries a presumption not available to offline intermediaries, thereby 
establishing a two-track system of liability.  
 
In addition to short-circuiting the analysis of whether particular content qualifies as 
speech at all, an overly indulgent view of Section 230 also short-circuits the analysis of 
whether the speech is or should be protected. This view treats all online activity as 
normatively significant free expression. It supposes that all user-generated content 
involves presumptively protected speech. Under this view, collateral censorship is 
inevitable as is the destruction of the “marketplace of ideas.”  
 
This view reflects what Leslie Kendrick describes as “First Amendment expansionism”—
the tendency to treat speech as normatively significant no matter the actual speech in 
question.89  As Kendrick wisely observes, First Amendment expansionism is likely “in an 
information economy where many activities and products involve communication.”90 
The debate over Section 230 bears this out.  
 
Viewing all online speech as normatively significant or presumptively protected elides 
the different reasons why certain speech is viewed as distinctly important in our system 
of free expression.91 Some speech matters for self-expression, but not all speech does.92 
Some speech is important for the search for truth or for self-governance, but not all speech 
serves those values. Also, as Kenneth Abraham and Edward White argue, the “all speech 
is free speech” view devalues the special cultural and social salience of speech about 
matters of public concern.93 And it disregards the fact that speech about private 
individuals about purely private matters may not remotely implicate free speech values 
 
88 (Goldman, supra, at 6) 
89 Leslie Kendrick, First Amendment Expansionism, 56 William & Mary L. Rev. 1199, 1212 (2015). As Leslie 
Kendrick explains, freedom of speech is a “term of art that does not refer to all speech activities, but rather 
designates some area of activity that society takes, for some reason, to have special importance.”   
90 Id. 
91 Kendrick, supra note, at. 
92 Id. 
93 Kenneth S. Abraham & Edward G. White, 
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at all. As the Court has repeatedly observed, not all speech receives full protection under 
the First Amendment.94 
 
The indulgent approach to Section 230 veers far away from the public discourse values 
at the core of the First Amendment, as well as from the original intentions of Section 230’s 
sponsors. Christopher Cox, a former Republican Congressman who co-sponsored Section 
230, has been openly critical of “how many Section 230 rulings have cited other rulings 
instead of the actual statute, stretching the law,” asserting that “websites that are 
‘involved in soliciting’ unlawful materials or ‘connected to unlawful activity should not 
be immune under Section 230.’”95 The Democratic co-sponsor of Section 230, Senator Ron 
Wyden, has similarly emphasized that he “wanted to guarantee that bad actors would 
still be subject to federal law. Whether the criminals were operating on a street corner or 
online wasn’t going to make a difference.”96 
 
There is no justification for treating the Internet as a magical speech conversion machine: 
if the conduct would not be speech protected by the First Amendment if it occurs offline, 
it should not be transformed into speech merely because it occurs online. Content that 
unquestionably qualifies as speech should not be presumed to be doctrinally or 
normatively protected. Intermediaries seeking to take advantage of Section 230’s 
protections – given that those protections were intended to foster free speech values – 
should have to demonstrate, rather than merely tacitly assert, that the content at issue is 
in fact speech. 
 
B. Neutrality and the State Action Doctrine  
 
The conflation of the First Amendment and Section 230, and Internet activity with speech, 
contributes to another common misconception about the law, which is that it requires 
tech companies to act as “neutral public forums” in order to receive the benefit of 
immunity. Stated slightly differently, the claim here is that tech companies receive 
Section 230’s legal shield only if they refrain, as the First Amendment generally requires 
the government to refrain, from viewpoint discrimination. On this view, a platform’s 
removal, blocking, or muting of user-generated content based on viewpoint amounts to 
impermissible censorship under the First Amendment that should deprive the platform 
of its statutory protection against liability.97  
 
 
94 See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468-69 (2010) (noting existence of “well-defined and narrowly 
limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any 
Constitutional problem” (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942)). 
95 Alina Selyukh, Section 230: A Key Legal Shield For Facebook, Google Is About To Change, NPR 
(Mar. 21, 2018).  https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2018/ 
03/21/591622450/section-230-a-key-legal-shield-for-facebook-google-is-about-to-change. 
96 Ron Wyden, Floor Remarks: CDA 230 and SESTA, Medium (Mar. 21, 2018).  
https://medium.com/@RonWyden/floor-remarks-cda-230-and-sesta-32355d669a6e. 
97 https://www.lawfareblog.com/ted-cruz-vs-section-230-misrepresenting-communications-decency-act 
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This misconception is twofold: first, there is nothing in the legislative history or text of 
Section 230 that supports such an interpretation.98 Not only does Section 230 not require 
platforms to act neutrally vis-à-vis political viewpoints as state actors should, it urges 
exactly the opposite. Under Section 230(b)(4), one of the statute’s policy goals includes 
“remov[ing] disincentives for the development and utilization of blocking and filtering 
technologies.”99 
 
Secondly, the “neutral platform” myth completely ignores the state action doctrine, 
according to which the obligations created by the First Amendment fall only upon 
government actors, not private actors. Attempting to extend First Amendment 
obligations to private actors is not only constitutionally incoherent, but endangers the 
First Amendment rights of private actors against compelled speech.100 
 
High-profile examples of the “neutral platform” argument include Representative 
Gianforte denouncing Facebook’s refusal to run a gun manufacturer’s ads as blatant 
“censorship of conservative views.”101 Senator Ted Cruz has argued that “big tech enjoys 
an immunity from liability on the assumption they would be neutral and fair. If they’re 
not going to be neutral and fair, if they’re going to be biased, we should repeal  the 
immunity from liability so they should be liable like the rest of us.”102 Along these lines, 
Representative Louie Gohmert contended that “Instead of acting like the neutral 
platforms they claim to be in order obtain their immunity . . . . social media companies 
have use[d their] platforms and algorithms to silence and prevent income to 
conservatives.”103  
 
It is not just politicians who fall under the spell of the viewpoint neutrality myth. The 
Daily Wire’s Editor, Chief Josh Hammer, tweeted: “It is not government overreach to 
demand that Silicon Valley tech giants disclose their censorship algorithms in exchange 
for continuing to receive CDA Sec. 230 immunity.”104 
 
 
98 As Rep. Cox recently underscored, “nowhere, nowhere, nowhere does the law say anything about 
[neutrality].” https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/why-republicans-even-couple-democrats-
want-throw-out-tech-s-n1043346     
99 230(b)(4). 
100 See West Virginia v. Barnette; Manhattan Corp. v. Halleck. 
101 https://www.c-span.org/video/?465331-1/google-reddit-officials-testify-internet-consumer-
protection 
102 https://www.fastcompany.com/90252598/ted-cruz-made-it-clear-he-supports-repealing-tech-
platforms-safe-harbor. Democratic Senators have also reinforced this myth. For instance, Senator Mark 
Warner claimed that “there was a decision made that social media companies, and their connections, were 
going to be viewed as kind of just dumb pipes, not unlike a telco.” 
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20190929/00171443090/senator-mark-warner-repeats-senator-ted-
cruzs-mythical-made-up-incorrect-claims-about-section-230.shtml 
103 https://gohmert.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=398676. 
104 https://www.vox.com/2019/6/26/18691528/section-230-josh-hawley-conservatism-twitter-facebook 
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Several legislative proposals endeavor to reset Section 230 to incentivize platforms to act 
as quasi-governmental actors with a commitment to viewpoint neutrality. Consider 
Senator Josh Hawley’s bill “Ending Support for Internet Censorship Act.”105  Under the 
Hawley proposal, Section 230’s legal shield would be conditioned on companies of a 
certain size obtaining FTC certification of their “political neutrality.” Under 
Representative Gohmert’s proposal, Section 230 immunity would be conditioned on a 
content platform’s posting of user-generated content in chronological order. Making 
judgments—in other words, moderating—about content’s prominence and visibility 
would mean the loss of the legal shield.106  
 
It is important to note that there is no empirical basis for the claim that conservative 
viewpoints are being suppressed on social media. Facebook, responding to concerns 
about anti-conservative bias, hired former Senator John Kyl and lawyers at Covington & 
Burling to conduct an independent audit of potential anti-conservative bias.107 The 
Covington Interim Report did not conclude that Facebook had anti-conservative bias.108 
As Siva Vaidhyanathan observes, there is no evidence for accusations that social media 
companies are disproportionately silencing conservative speech: the complaints are 
“simply false” and that studies suggest that conservative political campaigns have in fact 
leveraged social media to much greater advantage than their adversaries.109  
 
But even if the claims of anti-conservative bias on platforms did have basis in reality, the 
“neutral platform” interpretation of Section 230 takes two forms that actually serve to 
undermine, not promote, First Amendment values. The first involves the conflation of 
private companies with state actors, while the second is the characterization of social 
media platforms with public forums. Tech companies are not governmental or quasi-
governmental entities, and social media companies and most online service providers are 
not publicly owned or operated.110 Both of these forms of misidentification ignore private 
actors’ own First Amendment rights to decide what content they wish to endorse or 
promote.  
 
105 Hawley claimed in a tweet that Section 230’s legal shield was predicated on platforms serving as “for[a] 
for a true diversity of political discourse.” https://reason.com/2019/07/29/section-230-is-the-internets-
first-amendment-now-both-republicans-and-democrats-want-to-take-it-away/ 
106 https://gohmert.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=398676 
107 Senator John Kyl, Covington Interim Report, available at 
https://fbnewsroomus.files.wordpress.com/2019/08/covington-interim-report-1.pdf. 
108 Id. The audit found Facebook’s advertising policies prohibiting shocking and sensational content 
resulted in the rejection of pro-life ads focused on survival stories of infants born before full-term. Facebook 
adjusted its enforcement of this policy to focus on prohibiting ads only when the ad shows someone in 
visible pain or distress or where blood and bruising is visible. 
109 https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/07/conservatives-pretend-big-tech-biased-
against-them/594916/. 
110 Citron & Richards, supra note, at 1361 (exploring how entities comprising our digital infrastructure, 
including search engines, browsers, hosts, transit providers, security providers, internet service providers, 
and content platforms, are privately-owned with certain exceptions like the Internet Corporation for 
Assigned Names and Numbers). 
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Neither Section 230 nor judicial doctrine equates “interactive computer services” with 
state guarantors of First Amendment protections. As private actors, social media 
companies are no more required to uphold the First Amendment rights of their users 
than would be bookstores or restaurants to their patrons.111 As Eugene Kontorovich 
testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee’s hearing on “Stifling Free Speech: 
Technological Censorship and the Public Discourse:” 
 
If tech platforms “engage in politically biased content-sorting . . . . it is not a First 
Amendment issue. The First Amendment only applies to censorship by the 
government. . . . The conduct of private actors is entirely outside the scope of the First 
Amendment. If anything, ideological content restrictions are editorial decisions that 
would be protected by the First Amendment. Nor can one say that the alleged actions 
of large tech companies implicate ‘First Amendment values,’ or inhibits the 
marketplace of ideas in ways analogous to those the First Amendment seeks to protect 
against.”112 
 
The alternative argument attempts to treat social media platforms as traditional public 
forums like parks, streets, or sidewalks. The public forum has a distinct purpose and 
significance in our constitutional order. The public forum is owned by the public and 
operated for the benefit of all.113 The public’s access to public parks, streets, and sidewalks 
is a matter of constitutional right.114 The public forum doctrine is premised on the notion 
that parks, streets, and sidewalks have been open for speech “immemorially . . . time out 
of mind.”115 For that reason, denying access to public parks, streets, and sidewalks on the 
basis of the content or viewpoint of speech is presumptively unconstitutional.116 But 
wholly privately-owned social media platforms have never been designated as “neutral 
public forums.”117  
 
As one of us (Franks) has written, the attempt to turn social media controversies into 
debates over the First Amendment is an yet another example of what Frederick Schauer 
describes as “the First Amendment’s cultural magnetism”118 It suggests that “because 
 
111 See Manhattan Community Access v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1321 (2019) (finding privately-owned cable 
television channel not a state actor). 
112 Written Testimony of Professor Eugene Kontorovich Before Senate Judiciary Committee for “Stifling 
Free Speech: Technological Censorship and the Public Discourse” (April 10, 2019). 
113 Danielle Keats Citron & Neil M. Richards, Four Principles for Digital Expression (You Won’t Believe #3!), 95 
Wash. U. L. Rev. 1353, 1360 (2018). 
114 Id.  
115 Hague v. Comm. For Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939). 
116 Cf. Commonwealth v. Davis, 39 N.E. 113, 113 (Mass. 1895), aff’d, Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43, 47 
(1897). 
117 https://www.lawfareblog.com/ted-cruz-vs-section-230-misrepresenting-communications-decency-act 
118 Mary Anne Franks, The Free Speech Black Hole: Can the Internet Escape the Gravitational Pull of the First 
Amendment?, Knight Institute, available at https://knightcolumbia.org/content/the-free-speech-black-
hole-can-the-internet-escape-the-gravitational-pull-of-the-first-amendment. 
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private companies like Facebook, Twitter, and Google have become “state like” in many 
ways, even exerting more influence in some ways than the government, they should be 
understood as having First Amendment obligations, even if the First Amendment’s 
actual text or existing doctrine would not support it.”119 Under this view, the First 
Amendment should be expanded beyond its current borders.  
 
But the erosion of the state action doctrine would actually undermine First Amendment 
rights, by depriving private actors of “a robust sphere of individual liberty,” as Justice 
Gorsuch recently expressed it in Halleck.120 An essential part of the right to free speech is 
the right to choose what to say, when to say it, and to whom. Indeed, the right not to 
speak at all is a fundamental aspect of the First Amendment’s protections. As the Court 
famously held in West Virginia v. Barnette, “If there is any fixed star in our constitutional 
constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in 
politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by 
word or act their faith therein.”121 
 
If content platforms are treated as governmental actors or their services deemed public 
fora, then they could not act as “Good Samaritans” to block online abuse. This would 
directly contravene the will of Section 230’s drafters.122 They could not combat spam, 
doxing, nonconsensual pornography, or deep fakes. 123 They could not prohibit activity 
that chases people offline. In our view, it is desirable for content platforms to address 
online abuse that imperils people’s ability to enjoy life’s crucial opportunities, including 
the ability to engage with others online.  
 
At the same time, the power that social media companies and other content platforms 
have over digital expression should not proceed unchecked, as it does in some respects. 
Currently, Section 230(c)(1)—the provision related to under-filtering content—shields 
companies from liability without any limit or condition, unlike Section 230(c)(2) that 
conditions the immunity for under-filtering on a showing of “good faith.” In Part III, we 
offer legislative reforms that would check that power afforded content platforms. The 
legal shield should be cabined to interactive computer services that wield their content-
moderation powers responsibly, as the drafters of Section 230 wanted.124  
 
119 Id.; Citron & Richards, supra note, at 1371. 
120 Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck (2019). 
121 W. Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943) 
122 Citron & Richards, supra note, at 1371. 
123 In connection with our work with CCRI, we have helped tech companies do precisely that. See Danielle 
Keats Citron, Sexual Privacy, Yale LJ (2019); Mary Anne Franks, “Revenge Porn” Reform: A View from the Front 
Lines, 69 FLA. L. REV. 1251 (2017).  
124 Of course, not all companies involved in providing our online experiences are alike in their power and 
privilege. Citron & Richards, supra note, at 1374. “As a company’s power over digital expression grows 
closer to total (meaning there are few to no alternatives to express oneself online), the greater the 
responsibilities (via regulation) attendant to that power.” Id. Companies running the physical 
infrastructure of the internet, such as internet service and broadband providers, have power over digital 
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We would lose much and gain little if Section 230 were replaced with the Hawley or 
Gohmert proposals. Section 230 already has a mechanism to address the unwarranted 
silencing of viewpoints. Under Section 230(c)(2), users or providers of interactive 
computer services enjoy immunity from liability for over-filtering or over-blocking 
speech only if they acted in “good faith.” Under current law, platforms could face liability 
for removing or blocking content without “good faith” justification, if a theory of relief 
exists on which they can be sued.125  
 
C. The Myth that Any Change to Section 230 Would Destroy Free Speech 
 
Another myth is that any Section 230 reform would jeopardize free speech in a larger 
sense, even if not strictly in the sense of violating the First Amendment. It is certainly true 
that free speech is a cultural as well as a constitutional matter. It is shaped by non-legal 
as well as legal norms, and tech companies play an outsized role in establishing those 
norms. We agree that there is good reason to be concerned about the influence of tech 
companies and other powerful private actors over the ability of individuals to express 
themselves. This is an observation we have been making for years – that some of the most 
serious threats to free speech come not from the government, but from non-state actors.126 
Marginalized groups in particular, including women and racial minorities, have long 
battled with private censorial forces as well as governmental ones. But the unregulated 
Internet – or rather, the selectively regulated Internet – is exacerbating, not ameliorating, 
this problem. The current state of Section 230 may ensure free speech for the privileged 
few, but protecting free speech for all will require reform.  
 
The concept of “cyber civil rights”127 speaks precisely to the reality that the Internet has 
rolled back many gains made for racial and gender equality. The anonymity, 
amplification, and aggregation possibilities offered by the Internet have allowed private 
actors to discriminate, harass, and threaten vulnerable groups on a massive scale.128 There 
is abundant empirical evidence showing that the Internet has been used to further chill 
 
expression tantamount to governmental power. In locations where people only have one broadband 
provider in their area, being banned from that provider would mean no broadband internet access at all. 
The (now-abandoned) net neutrality rules were animated by precisely those concerns. And, as Genevieve 
Lakier and Frank Pasquale have argued, the power of search engines may warrant far more regulation than 
currently exists. See Genevieve Lakier, The Problem Isn’t Analogies but the Analogies that Courts Use, Knight 
Institute; FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY (2014). Although social media companies are powerful, 
they do not have the kind of control over our online experiences as broadband providers or even search 
engines do. Users banned on Facebook could recreate a social network elsewhere, though it would be time 
consuming and likely incomplete. Dissatisfaction with Facebook has inspired people’s migration to upstart 
social network services like MeWe. See Citron & Richards, supra note, at 1374 (exploring different non-
constitutional ways that law can protect digital expression). 
125 At the symposium, Brian Leiter provided helpful comments on this point. 
126 See Franks, Democratic Surveillance; Beyond Free Speech for the White Man 
127 See Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, supra note, at. 
128 Id; Franks, Unwilling Avatars 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3532691
University of Chicago Legal Forum (forthcoming 2020) 
 
 20 
the intimate, artistic, and professional expression of individuals whose rights were 
already under assault offline.   
 
Even as the Internet has multiplied the possibilities of expression, it multiplied the 
possibilities of repression.129 The new forms of communication offered by the Internet 
have been used to unleash a regressive and censorious backlash against women, racial 
minorities, sexual minorities, and any other groups seeking to assert their rights of 
expression. The Internet lowers the costs of engaging in abuse by providing abusers with 
anonymity and social validation, while providing new ways to increase the range and 
impact of that abuse. The online abuse of women in particular amplifies sexist 
stereotyping and discrimination, compromising gender equality online and off. 
 
The reality of unequal free speech rights demonstrates why regulation not only may not 
chill speech, but can, when done carefully and well,  enhance speech and encourage more 
people to freely engage in speech. According to a 2017 study, regulating online abuse 
“may actually facilitate and encourage more speech, expression, and sharing by those 
who are most often the targets of online harassment: women.” The study’s author 
suggests that when women “feel less likely to be attacked or harassed,” they become more 
“willing to share, speak, and engage online.” Knowing that there are laws criminalizing 
online harassment and stalking “may actually lead to more speech, expression, and 
sharing online among adult women online, not less.” As expressed in the title of a recent 
article by one of us (Citron) and Jonathon Penney, sometimes “law frees us to speak.”130 
 
III. Moving Beyond the Myths: A Menu of Potential Solutions 
 
Having addressed misconceptions about the relationship between Section 230 and the 
First Amendment, state and private actors, and regulation and free speech outcomes, we 
turn to reform proposals that address the problems that actually exist and are legitimately 
concerning. This Part explores different possibilities for fixing the overbroad 
interpretation of Section 230. 
 
A. Against Carveouts   
 
Some reformers urge Congress to maintain Section 230’s immunity, but to create an 
explicit exception from its legal shield for certain types of behavior. A recent example of 
that approach is the Stop Enabling Sex Traffickers Act (SESTA), which passed by an 
overwhelming vote in 2016. The bill amended Section 230 by rendering websites liable 
for knowingly hosting sex trafficking content.  
 
That law, however, is flawed. By effectively pinning the legal shield on a platform’s lack 
of knowledge of sex trafficking, the law reprises the dilemma that led Congress to pass 
 
129 Franks, Cult of the Constitution, supra note, at.. 
130 Jonathon W. Penney & Danielle Keats Citron, When Law Frees us to Speak, Fordham L. Rev. (2018). 
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Section 230 in the first place. To avoid liability, platforms have resorted to either filtering 
everything related to sex or sitting on their hands so they cannot be said to have 
knowingly facilitated sex trafficking.131 That is the opposite of what the drafters of Section 
230 wanted—responsible content moderation practices. 
 
Olivier Sylvain offers another potential route for reform, who urges Congress to maintain 
Section 230’s immunity but to create an explicit exception from the legal shield for civil 
rights violations.132 He argues that other exceptions could be added, such as those related 
to combating nonconsensual pornography or child sexual exploitation.  
 
While we sympathize with the impulse to address particularly egregious harms, we 
argue that the best way to reform Section 230 is  not through  a piecemeal approach. The 
carveout approach is inevitably underinclusive, establishing a normative hierarchy of 
harms that leaves other harmful conduct to be addressed another day. Such an approach 
requires that Section 230’s exceptions would need to be regularly updated, an impractical 
option given the slow pace of congressional efforts and partisan deadlock.133  
 
B. A Modest Proposal – Speech, not Content 
 
In light of the observations made in Part II.A., one simple reform of Section 230 would be 
to make explicitly clear that the statute’s protections only apply to speech. The statutory 
fix is simple: replace the word “information” in (c)(1) with the word “speech.” Thus, that 
section of the statute would read: 
 
(1) Treatment of publisher or speaker 
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the 
publisher or speaker of any speech provided by another information content 
provider. 
 
This revision would put all parties in a Section 230 case on notice that the classification of 
content as speech is not a given, but a fact to be demonstrated. If a platform cannot make 
a showing that the content or information at issue is speech, then it should not be able to 
take advantage of Section 230 immunity.  
 
C. Excluding Bad Samaritans 
 
Another effective and modest adjustment would involve amending Section 230 to 
exclude bad actors from its legal shield. There are a few ways to do this. One possibility 
would be to deny the immunity to online service providers that “deliberately leave up 
 
131 Citron & Jurecic, supra note. 
132 Sylvain, supra note, at. 
133 See Citron, https://knightcolumbia.org/content/section-230s-challenge-civil-rights-and-civil-liberties. 
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unambiguously unlawful content that clearly creates a serious harm to others.”134 
Another would be to exclude from the immunity “the very worst actors:” sites 
encouraging illegality or that principally host illegality.135  
 
A variant on this theme would deny the legal shield to cases involving platforms that 
have solicited or induced unlawful content. This approach takes a page from 
intermediary liability rules in trademark and copyright law. As Stacey Dogan observed 
in that context, inducement doctrines allow courts to target bad actors whose business 
models center on infringement.136 Providers that solicit or induce unlawful content 
should not enjoy immunity from liability. This approach targets the harmful activity 
while providing breathing space for protected expression.137  
 
A version of this approach is embraced in the SHIELD Act, which one of us (Franks) 
assisted in drafting and the other (Citron) supported in advising lawmakers on behalf of 
CCRI. Because SHIELD is a federal criminal statute, Section 230 cannot be used as a 
defense against it. However, the statute creates a separate liability standard for providers 
of communications services that effectively grants them Section 230 immunity so long as 
the provider does not intentionally solicit, or knowingly and predominantly distribute, 
content that the provider actually knows is in violation of the statute.138  
 
D. Conditioning the Legal Shield on Reasonable Content Moderation 
 
There is a broader legislative fix that Benjamin Wittes and one of us (Citron) have 
proposed. Under that proposal, platforms would enjoy immunity from liability if they 
could show that their content-moderation practices writ large are reasonable. The 
revision to Section 230(c)(1) would read as follows: 
  
No provider or user of an interactive computer service that takes reasonable 
steps to address unlawful uses of its service that clearly create serious harm to 
others shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information 
provided by another information content provider in any action arising out 
of the publication of content provided by that information content provider.  
 
If adopted, the question before the courts in a motion to dismiss on Section 230 
grounds would be whether a defendant employed reasonable content moderation 
practices in the face of unlawful activity that manifestly causes harm to individuals. 
 
134 E-mail from Geoffrey Stone, Professor of Law, Univ. of Chi., to author (Apr. 8, 2018). 
135 Citron, Hate Crimes in Cyberspace, supra note, at. One of us (Citron) supported this approach as an 
important interim step to broader reform. Id.  
136 Stacey Dogan, Principled Standards vs. Boundless Discretion: A Tale of Two Approaches to Intermediary 
Trademark Liability Online, 37 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 503, 507-08 (2014).  
137 Id. at 508-09. 
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The question would not be whether a platform acted reasonably with regard to a 
specific use of the service. Instead, the court would ask whether the provider or user 
of a service engaged in reasonable content moderation practices writ large with regard 
to unlawful uses that clearly create serious harm to others.139  
 
Congressman Deven Nunes has argued that reasonableness is a vague and unworkable 
policy.140 Eric Goldman considers the proposal a “radical change that would destroy 
Section 230.” In Goldman’s estimation, “such amorphous eligibility standards” makes 
“Section 230 litigation far less predictable, and it would require expensive and lengthy 
factual inquiries into all evidence probative of the reasonableness of defendant’s 
behavior.”141  
  
Yes, a reasonableness standard would require evidence of a site’s content moderation 
practices. But impossibly vague or amorphous—it is not. Courts have assessed the 
reasonableness of practices in varied fields, from tort law to the Fourth Amendment’s 
ban on unreasonable searches and seizures.142 In a wide variety of contexts, the judiciary 
has invested the concept of reasonableness with meaning.143  
 
Courts are well suited to address the reasonableness of a platform’s speech policies and 
practices vis-à-vis particular forms of illegality that cause clear harm to others (at the 
heart of a litigant’s claims). The reasonableness inquiry would begin with the alleged 
wrongdoing and liability. To state the obvious, platforms are not strictly liable for all 
content posted on their sites. Plaintiffs need a theory of relief to assert against content 
platforms. Section 230’s legal shield would turn on whether the defendant employed 
reasonable content moderation practices to deal with the kind of harmful illegality 
alleged in the suit.  
 
139 Tech companies have signaled their support as well. For instance, IBM issued a statement saying that 
Congress should adopt the proposal and wrote a tweet to that effect as well. Ryan Hagemann, A Precision 
Approach to Stopping Illegal Online Activities, IBM THINK POLICY (July 10, 2019), 
https://www.ibm.com/blogs/policy/cda-230/; see also @RyanLeeHagemann, TWITTER (July 10, 2019, 3:14 
PM), https://twitter.com/RyanLeeHagemann/status/1149035886945939457?s=20 (“A special shoutout to 
@daniellecitron and @benjaminwittes, who helped to clarify what a moderate, compromise-oriented 
approach to the #Section230 debate looks like.”). 
140 See Congressman Deven Nunes’  questioning of one of us at a House Intelligence Committee hearing 
about deep fakes in June 2018, https://www.c-span.org/video/?c4802966/user-clip-danielle-citron-
explains-content-moderation. As Benjamin Zipursky explains, “For a term or a phrase to fall short of 
clarity because of vagueness is quite different from having no meaning at all, and both are different from 
having multiple meanings—being ambiguous.” Benjamin C. Zipursky, Reasonableness In and Out of 
Neligence Law, 163 Penn. L. Rev. 2131 (2015).  
141 Goldman, supra note, at 45.  
142 Reasonableness is the hallmark of negligence claims. Benjamin C. Zipursky, Reasonableness In and Out of 
Neligence Law, 163 PENN. L. REV. 2131, 2135 (2015) (“The range of uses of “reasonableness” in law is so great 
that a list is not an efficient way to describe and demarcate it.”). 
143 This is not to suggest that all uses of the concept of reasonableness are sound or advisable. There is a 
considerable literature criticizing various features of reasonableness inquiries. In this piece, we endeavor 
to tackle the most salient critiques of reasonableness in the context of content moderation practices. 
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Let’s take an example. Suppose a social network is sued for defamation and negligent 
enablement of a crime. In the complaint, the plaintiff alleges that her nude photos were 
posted on defendant’s site without consent. Plaintiff further alleges that the photos and 
deep fake videos appeared alongside her name and address. Hundreds of strangers rang 
the plaintiff’s doorbell at night, demanding sex. One man broke into her house and 
plaintiff had to call the police. Regrettably, defendant failed to respond to her reports of 
abuse. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss on Section 230 grounds, alleging that its 
terms of service (TOS) bans stalking and sexual-privacy invasions like nonconsensual 
pornography and the site has procedures in place that enables it to respond to complaints 
quickly. 
 
The question before the court would be whether the defendant’s content moderation 
practices towards the kind of harm-causing conduct alleged in the suit—defamation and 
sexual-privacy invasions—were reasonable. Defendant submits evidence showing it has 
a clear policy against cyber stalking and sexual privacy invasions. On average, the site’s 
content moderators respond to complaints about sexual-privacy invasions and 
cyberstalking within a week’s time. The site has an easy-to-use process to report abuse. 
It uses a hashing process to prevent the reposting of nude images determined by the site 
to violate the site’s TOS.144 Defendant acknowledges that its moderators did not act 
quickly enough in plaintiff’s case but that generally speaking its speech rules and 
procedures satisfy the reasonableness inquiry. 
 
The court would likely grant the defendant’s motion to dismiss on Section 230 grounds. 
The defendant has clearly stated standards and a systematic process to consider 
complaints.  The court would likely find the site’s moderation practices reasonable given 
its systematic process to deal with the harmful conduct of the sort alleged in the 
complaint even though the site had fallen short of that standard in the plaintiffs’ case. 
The key is the reasonableness of the site’s practices writ large, not its response in any 
given case.   
 
There isn’t a one-size-fits-all approach to reasonable content moderation. Reasonableness 
is tailored to the harmful conduct at hand and the size and nature of the platform. A 
reasonable approach to sexual-privacy invasions would be different from a reasonable 
approach to fraud or spam. Crucially, the assessment of reasonable content-moderation 
practices would take into account differences among content platforms. A blog with a 
few postings a day and a handful of commenters is in a different position than a social 
network with millions of postings a day. The social network could not plausibly respond 
to complaints of abuse immediately, let alone within a day or two, whereas the blog 
 
144 For a discussion of Facebook’s hashing process as an illustration of an effective market response to 
nonconsensual pornography, see Danielle Keats Citron, Sexual Privacy, Yale LJ (2019). 
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could. On the other hand, the social network and the blog could deploy technologies to 
detect and filter content that they previously determined was unlawful.145   
 
A reasonableness standard would not “effectively ‘lock in’ certain approaches, even if 
they are not the best or don’t apply appropriately to other forms of content,” as critics 
suggest.146 The promise of a reasonableness approach is its elasticity. As technology and 
content moderation practices changes, so will the reasonableness of practices. As new 
kinds of harmful online activity emerge so will the strategies for addressing them.  
 
A reasonable standard of care will reduce opportunities for abuse without interfering 
with the further development of a vibrant internet or unintentionally turning innocent 
platforms into involuntary insurers for those injured through their sites. Approaching the 
problem as one of setting an appropriate standard of care more readily allows 
differentiating between different kinds of online actors. Websites that solicit illegality or 
that refuse to address unlawful activity that clearly creates serious harm should not enjoy 
immunity from liability. On the other hand, social networks that have safety and speech 
policies that are transparent and reasonably executed at scale should enjoy the immunity 
from liability as the drafters of Section 230 intended. 
 
Conclusion 
 
A crucial task in any reform project is clear-eyed thinking. And yet clear-eyed thinking 
about the Internet is often difficult. The Section 230 debate is, like many  other tech policy 
reform projects, beset by misconceptions. We have taken this opportunity to dispel myths 
around Section 230 so that this reform moment, a long time coming and anticipated, is 
not wasted.   
 
Reforming Section 230 is long overdue. Law should change to ensure that such power is 
wielded responsibly. With Section 230, Congress sought to provide incentives for “Good 
Samaritans” engaged in efforts to moderate content. Their goal was laudable. Section 230 
should be amended to condition the immunity on reasonable moderation practices rather 
than the free pass that exists today. Market pressures and morals are not always enough, 
and they should not have to be.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
145 Citron, Sexual Privacy, supra note (discussing Facebook’s hashing initiative to address nonconsensual 
distribution of intimate images). 
146 Mike Masnick, supra note, at. 
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